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Abstract 
 
In recent years, information systems have not been 
largely evaluated by their operating costs, but mainly 
by their strategic benefit and competitive advantage. 
As blockchain-based decentralized applications 
become more commonplace, representing a shift 
towards fully consumption-based distributed 
computing, a new mode of thinking is required of 
developers, with meticulous attention to computational 
resource efficiency. 
This study improves on a blockchain application 
designed for conducting microtransactions of 
electricity in a nanogrid environment. By applying the 
design science research methodology, we improve the 
efficiency of the application’s smart contract by 11 %, 
with further improvement opportunities identified. 
Despite the results, we find the efficiency remains 
inadequate for public Ethereum deployment. 
From the optimization process, we extrapolate a set 
of general guidelines for optimizing the efficiency of 
Ethereum smart contracts in any application. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the past decade, digital platforms have 
transformed the provision of applications in digital 
networks [11,33,39]. Traditionally, these platforms 
have been built using centrally controlled system 
architecture [1,4]. Recently, however, it has become 
increasingly popular to provide applications via 
decentralized blockchain smart contracts, governed by 
algorithmic incentives [5,36]. As the computational 
resources of these blockchain networks are allocated 
and priced according to free market mechanics 
[9,13,21,24], resource-efficiency and cost-optimization 
are placed in the center of application development. 
The efficiency of information systems and business 
computing applications has not received wide attention 
in research lately. Ever since the 1980s, IT systems 
have not been mainly evaluated by their operating 
costs, but rather by their enhanced market access, 
product differentiation, strategic benefit and 
competitive advantage [20]. The systems have been 
largely perceived as investments with long-term effects 
and benefits [34], across their whole lifecycle [37] and 
most often emphasizing infrastructures, human 
resources and IT-enabled intangibles [2]. 
The advent of grid and cloud computing has 
gradually changed this long-term investment-based 
view to a short-term utility-based one. This change has 
produced some novel theoretical models on prices, 
revenues, and resource utilization [3,26]. Also, more 
general considerations on the new economic models of 
cloud computing [6] and grid computing [7] have been 
published.  
As blockchain technology moves computing as 
utility even further, a new mode of thinking is required 
of software developers, with meticulous attention to 
computational efficiency. While some theoretical 
research has focused on embedded costs [15] and 
institutional changes [12] of blockchain, so far there 
has been little in the way of formal research into the 
optimization of blockchain-based smart contracts. 
In the absence of a centralized authority, 
blockchain networks can consume vast amounts of 
electricity to maintain consensus [21]. The Ethereum 
smart contract platform, for example, has been 
estimated to consume more electricity than the country 
of Iceland, constituting approximately 1/1000th of the 
world’s electricity consumption in total [14]. 
Advancing the understanding and developing best 
practices in the optimization of blockchain-based smart 
contracts is important to ensure that the maximum 
innovation output and utility is achieved in return for 
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 the vast energy consumption of such systems and their 
strain on the environment at large [27]. 
The objective of this paper is to improve and 
analyze the feasibility of an experimental distributed 
blockchain market application designed for conducting 
microtransactions of electricity in a nanogrid 
environment [19,23]. The paper applies the design 
science research methodology by Peffers et al. [29] to 
explore novel ways to improve the efficiency of the 
application’s smart contract and to reduce its operating 
costs in the Ethereum network. During this process, we 
introduce a new set of general guidelines for 
optimizing the efficiency of Ethereum-based smart 
contracts.  
By implementing two of the identified 
improvement opportunities, we benchmark the 
efficiency of the smart contract improved by 11 %. 
While not adequate for economic feasibility on the 
public Ethereum blockchain, we establish that further 
improvements are likely to be possible with more 
radical reformations to the source code, redefined 
market mechanics, and the use of an alternative 
deployment environment. Overall, the study 
demonstrates that decentralized applications should 
implement their own functional layers on top of the 
smart contract, keeping the contract as simple and as 
low in resource consumption as possible. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
provides a background for the paper by explaining 
some of the core technological concepts. Section 3 
describes the blockchain electricity market smart 
contract analyzed and improved in this paper. Section 4 
documents the process of optimization conducted in 
this study, starting with the problem identification and 
ending with the evaluation of the outcome. Section 5 
contains some discussion on the findings. Finally, 
Section 6 presents the conclusions. 
 
2. Technological descriptions 
 
2.1 Blockchain technology 
 
Blockchain technology enables the creation of 
decentralized, distributed and replicated digital ledgers. 
The technology itself consists of components such as 
peer-to-peer networking, public-key cryptography, 
digital tokens, a decentralized consensus algorithm and 
a tamper-resistant chain of blocks used to store 
database modifications [28,32]. Originally, the term 
was used solely in reference to the cryptographically 
concatenated data structure employed by blockchain 
systems such as the Bitcoin cryptocurrency network. 
Later on, however, the term has taken the broader 
meaning of the technological composition behind such 
systems at large, in various configurations [25]. 
While cumbersome and often more expensive to 
operate than centralized systems, blockchain networks 
can be useful due to their tamper-resistant and non-
hierarchical quality. Built on public open-source 
protocols, they can also help foster the growth of 
digital ecosystems with a bottom-up approach different 
from conventional centralized platforms. For this 
reason, cryptocurrency is an essential component of 
any permissionless blockchain. It can be used to 
facilitate economic incentives for the pseudonymous 
participants in the network to collaborate with one 
another and to maintain the integrity of the shared 
blockchain database [11,21,24]. 
 
2.2 Smart contracts 
 
Blockchain technology has enabled the creation of 
decentralized execution environments for smart 
contracts. In comparison to conventional digital 
contracts, blockchain-enabled smart contracts expand 
the digital contracting space by enabling tamper-proof 
storage and decentralized algorithmic execution [10]. 
Moreover, diverging from contracts concluded in the 
form of action, speech or writing, a smart contract is 
characteristically a computer program built in code [5].  
 The concept of a smart contract is best explained 
by an example. A vending machine takes coins and a 
push of a button as inputs and dispenses change and a 
product as outputs. The vending machine always acts 
deterministically according to the same set of 
instructions. Inserting coins into a machine is seen as a 
sign of agreement with the terms of the vending 
machine's embedded contract. The vending machine is 
able to autonomously manage the process of handling a 
customer's money and selling a product without an 
external adjudicator [31]. Much in the same way as 
vending machines, digital smart contracts can 
essentially be characterized as cryptographic “boxes” 
containing value that only unlocks upon the fulfilment 
of the preconditions determined in their design [5]. 
Thus, they are able to handle the fulfillment of the 
contractual clauses embedded in their software without 
human intervention. Furthermore, they are able to 
penalize breaches of contract and prevent any 
unauthorized changes to their code [22,31]. 
For this paper, we define smart contracts as digital 
programs that: a) are written in computer code and 
formulated using programming languages, b) are 
collectively stored, executed and enforced by a 
distributed blockchain network, c) can receive, store, 
and transfer digital assets of value, and d) can execute 
with varying outcomes according to their specified 
internal logic [22].  
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 2.3 Ethereum 
 
In recent years, blockchain technology has helped 
in overcoming the obstacles smart contracts previously 
faced. One such milestone was the launching of the 
decentralized application platform Ethereum in 2015. It 
offers a Turing-complete programming language for 
writing smart contracts and allows the deployment of 
smart contracts into its blockchain [5]. 
Ethereum smart contracts can serve as a back-end 
for decentralized applications. The benefits of using an 
Ethereum smart contract instead of a new blockchain 
include faster and easier development, bootstrapped 
security, and being able to communicate with other 
decentralized applications deployed in the Ethereum 
blockchain [5]. 
Ethereum utilizes a transaction fee system to 
prevent denial-of-service attacks and to incentivize 
efficient smart contract deployment. A transaction 
fee—or gas consumption—is determined by the 
amount of computational work, network bandwidth 
and storage space the transaction consumes [5]. This 
type of a fee system, instead of a simpler model, such 
as the one in Bitcoin, is required due to the Turing-
complete programming language in which Ethereum 
smart contracts are implemented. The fee system must 
be able to charge on a per computational step basis in 
order to avoid the execution of infinite loops with 
infinite resource expenditure. 
The contracts’ code is run on Ethereum Virtual 
Machine (EVM) to ensure that the execution 
environment is always identical and hardware-
independent. Every operation executed in the EVM is 
executed on every full Ethereum node, as nodes must 
validate new blocks before appending the blockchain.  
 
3. A blockchain-based electricity market 
application 
 
This section describes the Ethereum smart contract 
of the blockchain electricity market application 
analyzed in Section 4. The application provides a 
decentralized marketplace where nanogrid participants 
can sell excess electricity to one another. Since the 
marketplace is implemented as an Ethereum smart 
contract, it has no need for a central authority that 
could censor offers, steal users' deposits, or do front-
running. In addition to providing a platform for making 
contracts and trading electricity, the application also 
inherently facilitates payment processing, using 
Ethereum's native cryptocurrency, ether. 
For a smart contract to be useful for energy trading, 
a system composing of the following components is 
required: 1) a smart contract facilitating the 
marketplace; 2) a small-scale electrical network for 
delivering electricity (i.e. a nanogrid); 3) smart meters 
serving as access points to the nanogrid; and 4) a 
reputation system for assessing the trustworthiness of 
smart meters. However, in this paper, we do not 
specify the non-software components or the reputation 
system involved. 
 
3.1 Electricity markets today and in the future 
 
Due to the non-storable nature of electricity, supply 
and consumption must be constantly balanced in 
electrical grids. With multiple producers and 
consumers interacting with the grid, determining the 
price for each instance where supply and demand meet 
is vital for grid balancing. In most developed markets, 
price formation occurs at power exchanges, such as 
Nord Pool, where a range of power delivery contracts 
are used to balance the supply and the demand [35]. 
In EU countries, the percentage-share of renewable 
energy in gross final energy consumption has risen 
from 9 percent to 16.7 percent in a ten-year time span 
between 2005 and 2015 [16]. Solar photovoltaic 
generation and many other renewable systems allow 
distributed generation near the points of demand, 
reducing transmission losses [38]. Such localized 
power production could transform the current vertical, 
centralized energy system into a more horizontal and 
distributed one. Conventional power generation, such 
as coal-fired power plants, allow power output to be 
steered to better match electricity demand. Therefore, 
given the price inelasticity on the demand side, grid 
balancing has traditionally taken place at the supply 
side [8]. However, with the growing share of 
intermittent renewable energy sources, future energy 
systems may require demand-side flexibility. Real-time 
pricing has been shown to affect demand and can be 
used to reduce curtailment [17]. 
With photovoltaic systems and wind energy 
systems becoming accessible and affordable, energy 
generation may shift from large energy companies to 
smaller organizations or consumers themselves. This 
could spur the rise of small-scale electrical networks, 
microgrids and nanogrids, that can be isolated from the 
main grid thanks to local generation, consumption and 
control. In such circumstances, a distributed market 
mechanism would be beneficial for nanogrid balancing 
and enabling interconnectivity between separate 
nanogrids. 
 
3.2 The process of transacting electricity 
 
In the smart contract’s logic, the process of an 
electricity transaction unfolds as follows (see Figure 1). 
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 First, a user wishing to sell electricity makes a 
transaction into a smart contract situated in the 
blockchain, constituting a selling offer and specifying 
the terms of a proposed agreement. Any other user 
wishing to accept the offer and its terms may do so by 
submitting a prepayment for the purchase into the 
smart contract, thus expressing their intent to enter into 
a contract. The prepayment, at this stage, is not yet 
transmitted to the seller, but rather held by the smart 
contract facilitating the trade. This way, it would be 
unwise for the buyer to back out of the trade, already 
having irrevocably committed to making the payment. 
The seller, however, may fail to provide enough 
electricity, thus breaching the contract. Thus, a 
reputation system, that can penalize economically, is 
needed to prevent producers from doing so. 
In the smart contract facilitating the transaction, 
two timestamps are specified: one for the starting time 
of the electricity transfer and one for the end of it. 
When the starting time occurs, the seller's and the 
buyer's smart meters allow the buyer and the seller to 
access the nanogrid and to transfer electricity. The 
smart meters act as gatekeepers for the nanogrid, 
preventing unauthorized electricity consumption or 
overload from occurring. The smart meters also record 
electric current and voltage during transmission, and 
using that data, they are able to tell whether the 
electricity transfer was successful. 
After the time period allocated for electricity 
transfer is over, the two smart meters autonomously 
create blockchain transactions, reporting on the 
successfulness of the electricity transfer on their 
owner's side. Based on the reports, the smart contract 
decides who can withdraw the prepayment made 
earlier by the buyer. The desirable outcome is that both 
reports implicate a successful trade, and the seller may 
withdraw the payment. 
Sellers can populate the electricity market smart 
contract with multiple offers and buyers can accept any 
offer that suits them best. All offers and agreements are 
processed fully transparently. As a result, a fair market 
price should be discoverable by the users. 
 
3.3 Nanogrid characteristics 
 
The electricity market smart contract has no notion 
of transmission costs or transfer losses in the electrical 
grid. Therefore, it is only suited for a compact nanogrid 
network where transmission costs of electricity are 
small enough to render them irrelevant when 
considering who to transact with. The electricity 
market application examined in this report assumes a 
fully interconnected nanogrid topology. In other words, 
each access point is directly reachable from every other 
point without having to proxy through another access 
point. The nanogrid needs to have a commonly agreed 
voltage and current type (alternating or direct current). 
All participants of the nanogrid are connected to the 
nanogrid via a smart meter. Furthermore, although 
energy storing devices are not required from users, an 
ample use of batteries is expected locally behind the 
smart meters. To prevent outages in an interconnected 
nanogrid, each individual electricity transmission must 
happen exactly as planned. Throughout the timeframe 
specified in the smart contract, the seller is required to 
supply the network with the specified amount of 
 
Figure 1. A flowchart of the process of trading electricity in the marketplace facilitated by the 
smart contract. Each actor's actions are presented in a column of their own. 
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 power. In a parallel circuit, however, the lack of a 
consumption load on the buyer’s side is non-critical. 
 
3.4 Sale and purchase agreements 
 
The contract includes the four specifiers necessary 
for any electricity transfer contract: delivery period 
(start and end time), recipient (seller’s smart meter’s 
Ethereum address), size of the transfer (amount of 
electricity), and price. An id field is also added, 
containing a 256-bit unique identifier for the contract. 
When a buyer accepts a seller's offer, the buyer’s 
Ethereum address and their smart meter's Ethereum 
address are added into the contract. Finally, when the 
scheduled transmission of electricity is over, the 
seller's and the buyer's smart meters report whether in 
their view the transmission was successful or not. 
 
3.5 Smart meters 
 
Ethereum smart contracts only have access to data 
stored in the Ethereum blockchain. For this purpose, a 
smart meter is required for every user to act as an 
oracle (i.e. a trusted data feed into the blockchain) and 
to control the connection to the nanogrid. The smart 
meters either need to run their own Ethereum nodes or 
connect to an external trusted Ethereum node. For 
creating transactions, they must have their own 
Ethereum address and have access to their private key. 
The owners are expected to top up their smart meter’s 
account with ether to maintain their ability to pay 
transaction fees. 
Users of the electricity market application should 
not have full control of their smart meter, the software 
installed on it, or the private key of the smart meter's 
Ethereum address. Users should also not be able to 
bypass the smart meter and draw electricity directly 
from the nanogrid, as this would allow them to steal 
electricity and to manipulate results of the smart meter 
reports. Therefore, smart meters should be issued by a 
trusted party, presumably a company that manufactures 
or installs the smart meters. 
 
3.6 Smart contract 
 
The electricity market application involves two 
smart contracts written in the Solidity programming 
language. The SmartMeters.sol contract contains 
a mapping of smart meter addresses and their owners 
which the ElectricityMarket.sol contract is 
able to look up. In the ElectricityMarket.sol 
contract, there are five public, state changing functions: 
1) makeOffer, used to signal the willingness to sell 
electricity; 2) acceptOffer, used to accept standing 
offers; 3) buyerReport and 4) sellerReport, 
used by the smart meters to report the successfulness of 
a transaction into the blockchain; and 5) withdraw, 
used to withdraw the deposit of a specified offer. 
 
3.7 Scalability 
 
A successful trade in the electricity market smart 
contract requires five Ethereum transactions, 
consuming a total of over 400 000 gas. According to 
the website etherscan.io, on the 12th of June 2018, the 
average gas limit per block in the public Ethereum 
chain was 7 996 828 and the average block time was 
14.68 seconds. As a point of comparison, on the 13th of 
October 2017, the gas limit was 6 712 392 and the 
block time 31 seconds.    
Were the public Ethereum chain to exclusively 
process transactions that call functions of the electricity 
market smart contract, the blockchain would be able to 
handle roughly one trade per second. A throughput like 
this is easily enough for a single community's 
nanogrid. However, it is not enough for widespread 
adoption of the application, processing trades of 
multiple nanogrids along with the transactions of all 
the other smart contracts on the public Ethereum chain. 
Some method of increasing the scalability of the 
system is clearly needed. Either the application needs a 
significant reduction in gas consumption, or it needs to 
be executed in an environment other than the public 
Ethereum blockchain. 
 
4. Applying the design science research 
methodology 
 
In this section, design science research 
methodology by Peffers et al. [29] is applied to the 
electricity market smart contract. Design science is a 
suitable research approach when an innovative, 
purposeful artifact is created and evaluated for a 
special problem domain [18]. In our study, we built an 
artifact and evaluated it to ensure its utility for the 
problem. By using the design, we demonstrate why the 
general blockchain solution must be improved in this 
particular problem domain. We selected design science 
as our methodology because it offers a rigorous 
method for designing, building and evaluating the 
artifact.  
The methodology consists of a process model 
involving six activities: 1) problem identification and 
motivation, 2) defining the objectives for a solution, 
3) design and development, 4) demonstration, 
5) evaluation, and 6) communication. Since 
communication, as described by Peffers et al. [29], 
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 Table 1. The cost of completing a trade in the 
electricity market at various points in time. 
Date 
Gas 
price 
(Gwei) 
Ether 
price 
(USD) 
Total 
 cost 
(USD) 
13 Oct 2017 26.49 $302.89   $3.21 
14 Jan 2018 58.39 $1385.02 $32.35 
15 Feb 2018 21.57 $920.11   $7.94 
12 Jun 2018 14.04 $531.15   $2.98 
28 Aug 2018 12.80 $288.02   $1.48 
 
 
encompasses the entire research article, we will 
address activities 1–5 in this section. 
 
4.1 Problem identification and motivation 
 
In any public blockchain, a system of transaction 
fees is needed to arrange transaction priority, to 
prevent denial-of-service attacks, and to create an 
incentive for running the network and maintaining its 
consensus. 
To complete a successful trade in the electricity 
market, the seller needs to spend roughly 290 000 gas 
on three transactions (calling the functions 
makeOffer, sellerReport and withdraw) and 
the buyer roughly 110 000 gas (calling the functions 
acceptOffer and buyerReport). From 13th of 
October 2017 to 28th of August 2018, according to 
etherscan.io, the transaction cost of a trade to the seller 
varied between $1.07 and $23.45 (USD), and to the 
buyer between $0.41 and $8.90, depending on the 
fluctuations of the gas price and the ether price during 
the observed time interval (see Table 1).  
The cost of performing a trade sets a lower bound 
for the amounts of electricity that can be transmitted 
and thereby limits the possible uses of the application. 
For instance, it can never be profitable to sell 
electricity for one dollar, if the seller needs to pay two 
dollars in transaction fees. 
Implementing an electricity market as a blockchain 
application has several advantages compared to a 
centralized service but these advantages can be 
thwarted by high operating costs. The problem 
identified in the electricity market smart contract is 
that, at the estimated cost level, the public Ethereum 
blockchain would not be a viable deployment 
environment for the electricity market application. 
 
4.2 The objectives for a solution 
 
In Ethereum, transaction cost is simply gas price 
multiplied by the amount of gas consumed by the 
transaction [36]. To reduce transaction costs, at least 
one of these two values should be lowered. Gas price 
should generally not be controlled by Ethereum smart 
contracts, but instead selected by the user at the time of 
creating a transaction. This allows users to maintain the 
ability to choose between cheap transactions and 
getting their transaction included in the blockchain 
quickly. The amount of gas consumed, on the other 
hand, is a variable that can and should be optimized by 
smart contract developers. Ethereum's transaction fee 
system is built with the idea, that any use of 
computational, bandwidth or storage resources costs 
gas. Thus, making the contract less resource-intensive 
in any of these aspects will also reduce its gas 
consumption, therefore marking our objective. 
 
4.3 Design and development 
 
Trying to find inefficiencies in the smart contract's 
gas consumption, we approached each of the contract's 
five public functions individually. We first considered 
if there was a viable way of executing the function off-
chain. If not, we examined if another method of 
improvement would be applicable. During this process, 
we identified and applied the following principles: 
Avoid a design pattern where many new smart 
contracts need to be deployed, for instance, on a per-
user basis. At a cost of 32 000 gas, contract creation is 
the most expensive EVM operation. 
Keep the amount of transactions needed to interact 
with the smart contract low to diminish the impact of 
the transaction base fee of 21 000 gas. Design an 
interface with fewer functions that do more actions, 
rather than more functions that do fewer actions. 
Optimize the smart contract's use of storage space. 
Whenever possible, use memory instead of persistent 
storage. Storing a word in persistent storage costs 20 
000 gas, whereas storing a word in memory only costs 
3 gas plus a memory expansion fee, whenever more 
memory is required. The memory expansion fee scales 
quadratically as more memory is needed, so memory 
should be used densely.  
When the use of persistent storage is necessary, 
consider if the stored data could be replaced with its 
cryptographic hash on-chain, and the data itself could 
be stored off-chain. 
Delete contracts and data stored in persistent 
storage that are not needed, in order to gain gas 
refunds. 
Make use of off-chain transactions, using the 
blockchain only as an arbiter in case disputes happen. 
During the analysis, it was identified that the 
makeOffer function can be removed from the smart 
contract entirely. Instead of announcing sales offers in 
the blockchain, offers can be cryptographically signed 
by their creator and sent to potential buyers in an off-
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 chain communications channel, e.g. a peer-to-peer 
network. If a buyer later decides to accept the offer, the 
buyer must then include the sales offer along with the 
seller's digital signature as a parameter in their 
acceptOffer function call. This way, unaccepted 
offers do not needlessly bloat the blockchain yet a 
buyer can prove the authenticity of the offer by its 
digital signature. 
The expected reduction in gas consumption from 
implementing off-chain offers is approximately 21 000 
gas per a successful trade. This is due to not having to 
execute the makeOffer function anymore, and not 
needing to pay its transaction base fee. In addition to 
this saving, off-chain offers have the effect that offers 
that are never accepted by a buyer also never create a 
blockchain transaction, rendering them entirely free. 
This can be expected to enhance the efficiency of the 
electricity market due to much more efficient price 
discovery and lower transaction costs. 
The functions acceptOffer, buyerReport 
and sellerReport do not seem as straightforward 
to execute off-chain. An on-chain acceptOffer call 
is necessary to make sure that only one buyer can 
accept a given offer and to prove that the offer was 
accepted before its expiration. The smart meter report 
functions have a strict deadline before which they must 
be submitted. An on-chain function call is a simple 
way to prove that this deadline has been met. 
The withdraw function needs to be executed on-
chain in order for the funds to be transferred on-chain. 
It was identified, however, that the current design 
where a separate call needs to be made for each 
transfer of electricity is not optimal. If users were 
allowed to withdraw funds from multiple electricity 
transfer contracts using a single withdraw call, fewer 
transactions would be required and less gas would be 
spent on transaction base fees. With this modification, 
we estimate the saving per electricity transaction to be 
21000 −
21000
𝑛
 gas, where 21 000 is the Ethereum base 
transaction cost, and n is the number of trades from 
which a user can withdraw funds using a single 
withdraw call. 
 
4.4 Demonstration 
 
During the design and implementation work, three 
artifacts were produced. Each artifact is a variant of the 
electricity market smart contract with some attempted 
improvements implemented. Artifact 1 implemented 
off-chain offers, as discussed earlier in Section 4.3. In 
Artifact 2, the withdraw function was modified so 
that it takes an array of trade IDs as argument and 
attempts to withdraw funds from all of the listed trades. 
Artifact 3 combines the changes implemented in 
Artifacts 1 and 2, with both off-chain offers and an 
improved withdraw function implemented. 
A benchmark use case was executed on the 
artifacts, measuring the respective gas consumptions 
(see Tables 3–5). The same benchmark use case was 
also executed on the original electricity market smart 
contract, to be used as a reference (see Table 2). The 
benchmark use case was crafted so that it represents 
typical use of the smart contract where a number of 
trades are completed successfully: 1) as a seller, create 
n number of offers; 2) as a buyer, accept all created 
offers; 3) as the seller's smart meter, report all trades to 
have been successful; 4) as the buyer's smart meter, 
report all trades to have been successful; and 
5) withdraw all deposits to the seller's address. 
The variable n in step one translates to the number 
of electricity trades completed in the use case. The test 
case was executed with different values of n to see how 
different implementations perform when varying 
amounts of transactions are created. 
We measured the combined gas consumption of all 
the transactions created in the execution of the use 
case. The gas consumption of the transactions was 
inquired from the TestRPC instance using the 
eth_estimateGas function of the Ethereum JSON 
RPC API before the sending of each transaction. This 
function makes a transaction and returns its gas 
consumption but does not add the transaction to the 
blockchain. In a TestRPC configuration like the one 
used, the eth_estimateGas call is made to a 
blockchain of exactly the same state as its 
corresponding actual transaction, so the returned gas 
consumption estimate is equal to the true consumption. 
The measurements were run on an Ubuntu 16.04.3 
LTS machine. The Solidity smart contracts were 
compiled using the Solidity compiler solc version 
0.4.18. A local instance of TestRPC version 6.0.1 was 
used to simulate an Ethereum blockchain. TestRPC 
was configured to create a separate new block for each 
transaction. A block gas limit of 90 000 000 was 
configured.  
 
4.5 Evaluation 
 
The results collected from the first artifact show 
that the implementation of off-chain offers did reduce 
gas consumption of the smart contract in the selected 
use case. In measurements where a few trades were 
made, roughly a 5 percent decrease in gas consumption 
was achieved. When more trades were made, this 
percentage gradually decreased. That is, however, due 
to the smart contract becoming more populated with 
data and certain phases in its execution having to spend 
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 Table 3. Measurements from Artifact 1 that has 
off-chain offers implemented. 
Amount 
of trades 
(n) 
 
Gas consumed 
Difference 
to reference 
(%) 
Difference 
to reference 
(gas) 
1 379 534  -5.19   -20784 
2 745 578  -5.29   -20816 
3 1 113 260  -5.31   -20805 
4 1 482 516  -5.31   -20800 
5 1 853 346  -5.31   -20797 
6 2 225 750  -5.31   -20795 
7 2 599 728  -5.30   -20793 
8 2 975 280  -5.29   -20792 
16 6 036 168  -5.23   -20800 
32 12 459 832  -5.07   -20802 
64 26 517 208  -4.78   -20796 
128 59 466 520  -4.29   -20799 
 
Table 5. Measurements from Artifact 3, off-
chain offers and renewed withdraw function. 
Amount 
of trades 
 (n) 
 
Gas consumed 
Difference 
to reference 
(%) 
Difference 
to reference 
(gas) 
1 381 780  -4.63  -18538 
2 720 397  -8.49  -33407 
3 1 060 652  -9.78  -38341 
4 1 402 481  -10.43  -40809 
5 1 745 884  -10.80  -42289 
6 2 090 861  -11.05  -43276 
7 2 437 412  -11.21  -43981 
8 2 785 537  -11.33  -44510 
16 5 627 010  -11.65  -46372 
32 11 611 844  -11.53  -47302 
64 24 791 563  -10.98  -47759 
128 55 985 573  -9.89  -47994 
 
Table 4. Measurements from Artifact 2 that 
implements the renewed withdraw function. 
Amount 
of trades 
 (n) 
 
Gas consumed 
Difference 
to reference 
(%) 
Difference 
to reference 
(gas) 
1 402 564  +0.56  2246 
2 762 007  -3.20  -12602 
3 1 123 024  -4.48  -17551 
4 1 485 615  -5.12  -20025 
5 1 849 780  -5.49  -21510 
6 2 215 519  -5.74  -22500 
7 2 582 832  -5.92  -23207 
8 2 951 719  -6.04  -23737 
16 5 959 480  -6.43  -25593 
32 12 276 826  -6.47  -26521 
64 26 121 121  -6.20  -26985 
128 58 645 051  -5.61  -27217 
 
Table 2. Reference measurements from the 
original electricity market smart contract. 
 Amount 
of trades 
(n) 
 
Gas consumed 
 
 1 400 318  
 2 787 210  
 3 1 175 676  
 4 1 565 716  
 5 1 957 330  
 6 2 350 518  
 7 2 745 280  
 8 3 141 616  
 16 6 368 968  
 32 13 125 496  
 64 27 848 152  
 128 62 128 792  
 
 
gas on iterating that data. The absolute gas 
consumption savings achieved from off-chain offers do 
not seem to be reliant on the number of trades made, 
ranging narrowly from 20 784 to 20 816 gas per trade. 
This roughly equals to the base transaction fee of 21 
000 gas, which was the expected saving from not 
having to call the makeOffer function 
Implementing the ability to withdraw funds from 
multiple trades using a single transaction also led to 
savings in gas consumption, at best by over 6 percent. 
Surprisingly, with all n values other than 1, Artifact 2 
created larger savings than the initially estimated 
21 000 −
21 000
𝑛
 gas per electricity transaction. With n 
values greater than 4, the savings of the artifact 
exceeded the base transaction fee of 21 000 gas, which 
was anticipated to be the maximum gas saving 
opportunity for the artifact. We hypothesize that the 
extra savings at least partly originate from Artifact 2 
only calling the Solidity send function once, while the 
reference implementation calls it n times. As a result, 
slightly less EVM code needs to be executed. 
Artifact 3 was a combination of the changes in 
Artifacts 1 and 2: off-chain offers and the improved 
withdraw function. It is noteworthy that the gas 
consumption savings in Artifact 3 were almost exactly 
equal to the sum of savings gained in Artifacts 1 and 2. 
In other words, there was virtually no overlap in 
combining the two improvements. 
While we were able to reduce the gas consumption 
of the electricity market smart contract in this study, 
the reduction was a little over ten percent at best. 
Assuming that the market participants are using 
batteries to ensure their capability to make successful 
trades, a typical trade in the electricity market could be 
estimated to be in the same order of magnitude as the 
capacity of a large car battery. A 12-volt 100 Ah 
battery could theoretically output 1.2 kWh of 
electricity. Assuming a price of $0.1/kWh, the 
electricity transferred in a typical trade would be worth 
$0.12. In section 4.1, we showed that at the market 
prices over the past year or so, the total transaction cost 
of a trade in the original smart contract, deployed in the 
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 public Ethereum blockchain, would have varied 
between $1.48 and $32.35. Even with the gas savings 
achieved, the transaction costs remain disproportionate, 
and in fact orders of magnitude too high compared to 
the value of a typical use of the application. This would 
suggest that the implemented optimizations are not 
adequate to make the application economically feasible 
on the public Ethereum chain, at least for transactions 
as small as suggested and at the examined price levels. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
While we were not able to improve the efficiency 
of the electricity market smart contract to the point of 
economic feasibility, this study demonstrates how 
blockchain-based smart contracts require a new kind of 
utility-centric focus on resource management in 
software development. Any Ethereum smart contract in 
any application should always seek to perform the 
absolute minimum set of tasks required from it. 
Whenever possible, decentralized applications should 
implement their own functional layers on top of the 
smart contract to keep the smart contract as simple and 
as low in resource consumption as possible. 
The guidelines we produced for optimizing gas 
consumption of Ethereum smart contracts were 
successfully applied to pinpoint and fix inefficiencies 
in the electricity market smart contract. We estimate 
that the drafted guidelines are perfectly applicable for 
similar optimization tasks of any other Ethereum smart 
contract as well. 
Although we used price ranges based on the price 
variation over the past year or so to estimate economic 
feasibility, it should be acknowledged that due to the 
chaotic nature of the system, future gas price dynamics 
are difficult to predict. While deemed unlikely, any 
radical drops in the real price of gas would require the 
feasibility findings of this study to be re-evaluated. 
While having little impact on gas consumption in 
the benchmark use case, it was recognized that 
implementing off-chain offers could enable new types 
of price discovery mechanisms, potentially useful in 
other contexts. In a use case involving heavy use of 
selling offers that are never accepted, off-chain offers 
alone could reduce gas consumption significantly more 
than the 11 % measured. 
It is also quite possible that other improvable 
inefficiencies exist in the smart contract which were 
simply not identified or pursued in this paper. For 
example, a large share of the application's gas 
consumption is due to the use of persistent storage. We 
anticipate that significant gas savings could be 
achieved by only storing the hash of a sales and 
purchase agreement instead of its full details in the 
blockchain. The actual data could be hosted elsewhere, 
e.g. the Interplanetary File System (IPFS). 
As an alternative to deployment in the public 
Ethereum blockchain, the Plasma child blockchains 
proposed by Poon and Buterin [30], for example, may 
provide a viable platform for deployment in the future. 
A Plasma child chain could provide a similar execution 
environment connected to the Ethereum main chain, 
but with a lower demand for transactions, implying 
lower transaction costs. Another option would be to 
create a separate Ethereum blockchain instance 
entirely. While this would enable transactions at a mere 
fraction of the cost of the canonical Ethereum chain—
or even completely free of transaction fees 
altogether—the lack of support for the ether 
cryptocurrency and for the security of the canonical 
chain could turn out to be problematic. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this study, we explored ways to analyze and 
improve the feasibility of an experimental distributed 
blockchain market application designed for conducting 
microtransactions of electricity in a nanogrid 
environment [19,23]. By applying the design science 
research methodology by Peffers et al. [29], we 
managed to pinpoint inefficiencies in the design of the 
smart contract and to reduce its gas consumption by 
11 %. From this process, we formulated a set of 
general guidelines suitable for optimizing the 
efficiency of any Ethereum-based smart contract.  
While the improvement achieved in efficiency was 
not adequate for economic feasibility on the public 
Ethereum blockchain, we established that further 
improvements are likely to be possible with more 
radical reformations to the source code, redefined 
market mechanics, and the use of an alternative 
deployment environment. 
Further research is encouraged on the recognized 
improvement opportunities where additional efficiency 
gains could be achieved. We also invite the exploration 
of other new ways to improve the efficiency of 
Ethereum-based smart contracts. Furthermore, the 
price dynamics of gas and ether, and their effects on 
application feasibility, would benefit from a more 
structured delineation. 
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